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HODGE DECOMPOSITION AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE
OF A COOPERATIVE GAME
ARI STERN AND ALEXANDER TETTENHORST
Abstract. We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into
a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial
Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to
satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry, and linearity properties.
Consequently, we obtain a new characterization of the classical Shapley
value as the value of the grand coalition in each player’s component game.
We also relate this decomposition to a least-squares problem involving
inessential games (in a similar spirit to previous work on least-squares and
minimum-norm solution concepts) and to the graph Laplacian. Finally,
we generalize this approach to games with weights and/or constraints on
coalition formation.
1. Introduction
In cooperative game theory, one of the central questions is that of fair
division: if players form a coalition to achieve a common goal, how should
they split the profits (or costs) of that achievement among themselves? (We
restrict our attention to transferable utility games, also called TU games,
whose total value may be freely divided and distributed among the players.)
Shapley [25] introduced one of the classical solution concepts to this problem,
now known as the Shapley value, which he proved to be the unique allocation
that satisfies certain axioms.
In this paper, we show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into
a sum of component games, one for each player, where these components are
uniquely defined in terms of the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a
hypercube graph associated with the game. (That is, the value is apportioned
among the players for each possible coalition, not just the grand coalition
consisting of all players.) We prove that the Shapley value is precisely the
value of the grand coalition in each player’s component game.
This characterization of the game components and the Shapley value also
implies two equivalent characterizations: one in terms of the least-squares
solution to a linear problem, whose solution is exact if and only if the game is
inessential; the other in terms of the graph Laplacian. The first of these two
characterizations is related to the least-square and minimum-norm solution
concepts of Ruiz et al. [23] and Kultti and Salonen [21].
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. 91A12, 05C90.
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Furthermore, since the combinatorial Hodge decomposition holds for
arbitrary weighted graphs, this decomposition of cooperative games also
generalizes to cases where edges of the hypercube graph are weighted or
removed altogether. This may be seen as modeling variable willingness
or unwillingness of players to join certain coalitions, as in some models of
restricted cooperation. In the latter case, we compare the resulting solution
concepts with other “Shapley values” for games with cooperation restrictions,
such as the precedence constraints of Faigle and Kern [10] and the even more
general digraph games of Khmelnitskaya et al. [18].
We note that the combinatorial Hodge decomposition has recently been
used to decompose noncooperative games (Candogan et al. [1]) and has
also been applied to other problems in economics, such as ranking of social
preferences (Hirani et al. [11], Jiang et al. [16]). Here, we show that it can
also lend insight to cooperative game theory.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Cooperative games and the Shapley value. A cooperative game
consists of a finite set N of players and a function v : 2N → R, which assigns
a value v(S) to each coalition S ⊂ N , such that v(∅) = 0. Assuming that all
players cooperate (forming the “grand coalition” N), the question of interest
is how to split the value v(N) among the players.
The Shapley value φi(v) allocated to player i ∈ N is based entirely on
the marginal value v
(
S ∪ {i}) − v(S) the player contributes when joining
each coalition S ⊂ N \ {i}. It is uniquely defined according to the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Shapley [25]). There exists a unique allocation v 7→ (φi(v))i∈N
satisfying the following conditions:
(a) efficiency:
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N).
(b) null-player property: If v
(
S ∪ {i}) − v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N \ {i},
then φi(v) = 0.
(c) symmetry: If v
(
S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊂ N \ {i, j}, then
φi(v) = φj(v).
(d) linearity: If v, v′ are two games with the same set of players N , then
φi(αv + α
′v′) = αφi(v) + α′φi(v′) for all α, α′ ∈ R.
Moreover, this allocation is given by the following explicit formula:
(1) φi(v) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
|S|!(|N | − 1− |S|)!
|N |!
(
v
(
S ∪ {i})− v(S)).
The conditions (a)–(d) listed above are often called the Shapley axioms.
Simply stated, they say that (a) the value obtained by the grand coalition is
fully distributed among the players, (b) a player who contributes no marginal
value to any coalition receives nothing, (c) equivalent players receive equal
amounts, and (d) the allocation is linear in the game values.
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The formula (1) has the following useful interpretation. Suppose the
players form the grand coalition by joining, one-at-a-time, in the order
defined by a permutation σ of N . That is, player i joins immediately after
the coalition Sσ,i =
{
j ∈ N : σ(j) < σ(i)} has formed, contributing marginal
value v
(
Sσ,i ∪ {i}
) − v(Sσ,i). Then φi(v) is the average marginal value
contributed by player i over all |N |! permutations σ, i.e.,
(2) φi(v) =
1
|N |!
∑
σ
(
v
(
Sσ,i ∪ {i}
)− v(Sσ,i)).
The equivalence of (1) and (2) is due to the fact that |S|!(|N | − 1 − |S|)!
is precisely the number of permutations σ for which S = Sσ,i, since there
are |S|! ways to permute the preceding players and (|N | − 1− |S|)! ways to
permute the succeeding players.
For purposes of computation, of course, (1) is preferable to (2), since it
contains 2|N |−1 terms rather than |N |! terms. Computing the Shapley value
is #P-complete (Deng and Papadimitriou [7]), although some recent work
has explored polynomial algorithms for obtaining approximations to the
Shapley value (Castro et al. [2, 3]).
Example 2.2. The “glove game” is a classic illustrative example of a coop-
erative game. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and suppose that player 1 has a left-hand
glove, while players 2 and 3 each have a right-hand glove. The players wish
to put together a pair of gloves, which can be sold for value 1, while unpaired
gloves have no value. That is, v(S) = 1 if S ⊂ N contains both a left and a
right glove (i.e., player 1 and at least one of players 2 or 3) and v(S) = 0
otherwise. The Shapley values for this game are
φ1(v) =
2
3
, φ2(v) = φ3(v) =
1
6
.
This is perhaps easiest to interpret from the “average-over-permutations” per-
spective: player 1 contributes marginal value 0 when joining the coalition first
(2 of 6 permutations) and marginal value 1 otherwise (4 of 6 permutations),
so φ1(v) =
2
3 . Efficiency and symmetry immediately give φ2(v) = φ3(v) =
1
6 .
2.2. Combinatorial Hodge decomposition and the graph Laplacian.
This section briefly reviews a kind of “discrete calculus” on graphs, which can
be used to orthogonally decompose spaces of functions on vertices and edges.
This is a special case of the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on simplicial
complexes (Eckmann [9], Dodziuk [8]), which is itself a discrete version of
the Hodge decomposition on manifolds (Hodge [12, 13, 14, 15], Kodaira [19]).
While Hodge theory is a deep subject, connecting algebraic topology with
geometry and elliptic PDE theory, the case of graphs requires nothing more
than finite-dimensional linear algebra. Therefore, we take an elementary
approach here, and we refer readers interested in the more general theory to
the preceding references.
Let G = (V,E) be an oriented graph, where V is the set of vertices and
E ⊂ V × V is the set of edges. By “oriented,” we mean that at most one of
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(a, b) and (b, a) is in E for a, b ∈ V . If f : E → R and (a, b) ∈ E, we define
f(b, a) := −f(a, b) for the reverse-oriented edge. Denote by `2(V ) the space
of functions V → R, equipped with the `2 inner product
〈u, v〉 :=
∑
a∈V
u(a)v(a).
Similarly, denote by `2(E) the space of functions E → R with inner product
〈f, g〉 :=
∑
(a,b)∈E
f(a, b)g(a, b).
With respect to the standard bases defined by V and E, we can identify these
spaces with R|V | and R|E|, each equipped with the Euclidean dot product.
We next define a linear operator d: `2(V ) → `2(E) and its adjoint
d∗ : `2(E) → `2(V ), which are discrete analogs of the gradient and (neg-
ative) divergence of vector calculus (or, more generally, the differential and
codifferential of exterior calculus). Define d by
du(a, b) := u(b)− u(a).
With respect to the standard bases, the matrix of d is just the transpose of the
oriented incidence matrix of G. The adjoint is defined by 〈u, d∗f〉 := 〈du, f〉;
explicitly, this is given by
(d∗f)(a) =
∑
b∼a
f(b, a),
where b ∼ a denotes that (a, b) ∈ E or (b, a) ∈ E. Again, with respect to the
standard bases, the matrix of d∗ is just the transpose of that for d, i.e., the
oriented incidence matrix.
By the fundamental theorem of linear algebra (Strang [26]), we may
orthogonally decompose `2(V ) and `2(E) as
(3) `2(V ) = R(d∗)⊕N (d), `2(E) = R(d)⊕N (d∗),
where R(·) and N (·) denote range and kernel (nullspace). We call (3) the
combinatorial Hodge decomposition of `2(V ) and `2(E).
Finally, the graph Laplacian is defined by L := d∗d: `2(V )→ `2(V ). This
is identical to the usual graph Laplacian encountered in, e.g., spectral graph
theory (Chung [5]), usually expressed as L = D −A, where D is the degree
matrix and A is the (unsigned) adjacency matrix of the graph G. These
expressions for L are seen to be identical by observing that
(d∗du)(a) =
∑
b∼a
du(b, a) =
∑
b∼a
(
u(a)− u(b)) = deg(a)u(a)−∑
b∼a
u(b).
The graph Laplacian is intimately related to the Hodge decomposition in
several ways. Of particular interest to us, suppose we wish to compute the
decomposition of f ∈ `2(E) as du+ p = f , where u ∈ `2(V ) and p ∈ N (d∗).
Taking d∗ of both sides of this equation gives Lu = d∗f , so a solution yields
HODGE DECOMPOSITION AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE 5
the Hodge decomposition of f . This may also be seen as the system of
normal equations for the least-squares approximation of f by du ∈ R(d).
3. Decomposition of cooperative games
3.1. Cooperative games and the hypercube graph. Given the set of
players N , define the oriented graph G = (V,E) by
V = 2N , E =
{(
S, S ∪ {i}) ∈ V × V : S ⊂ N \ {i}, i ∈ N}.
This is precisely the |N |-dimensional hypercube graph, where each vertex
corresponds to a coalition S ⊂ N , and where each edge corresponds to the
addition of a single player i /∈ S to S, oriented in the direction of the inclusion
S ↪→ S ∪ {i}.
With respect to this graph, a cooperative game is precisely a function
v ∈ `2(V ) such that v(∅) = 0. Furthermore, dv ∈ `2(E) gives the marginal
value on each edge, i.e., dv
(
S, S ∪ {i}) is the marginal value contributed by
player i joining coalition S ⊂ N \ {i}. In order to talk about the marginal
contributions of an individual player i ∈ N , ignoring those of the other
players j 6= i, we introduce the following collection of “partial differentiation”
operators.
Definition 3.1. For each i ∈ N , let di : `2(V )→ `2(E) be the operator
diu
(
S, S ∪ {j}) = {du(S, S ∪ {i}) if i = j,
0 if i 6= j.
Therefore, div ∈ `2(E) encodes the marginal value contributed by player i
to the game v. For any permutation σ of N , which defines a path from ∅ to
N , the marginal value contributed by player i along this path is∑
j∈N
div
(
Sσ,j , Sσ,j ∪ {j}
)
= dv
(
Sσ,i, Sσ,i ∪ {i}
)
= v
(
Sσ,i ∪ {i}
)− v(Sσ,i),
which can be interpreted as a discrete “line integral” of div along the path.
3.2. Decomposition of inessential games. From Definition 3.1, we im-
mediately see that d =
∑
i∈N di. However, in general, R(di) 6⊂ R(d). To see
this, observe that for any permutation σ,∑
j∈N
du
(
Sσ,j , Sσ,j ∪ {j}
)
=
∑
j∈N
(
u
(
Sσ,j ∪ {j}
)− u(Sσ,j)) = u(N)− u(∅),
since the sum telescopes. This value is the same for every permutation σ,
which is a discrete analog of the fact that the line integral of a conservative
vector field depends only in the endpoints, not the particular path chosen.
Contrast this with the previous expression: we have already seen that
v
(
Sσ,i ∪ {i}
) − v(Sσ,i) may be different, depending on the permutation σ,
as in the glove game of Example 2.2. The question of when div ∈ R(d) is
related to the notion of inessential games, as we now show.
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Definition 3.2. The game v is inessential if v(S) =
∑
i∈S v
({i}) for all
S ⊂ N . That is, each coalition obtains the same value working together as
its individual members would obtain working separately.
Proposition 3.3. The game v is inessential if and only if div ∈ R(d) for
all i ∈ N .
Proof. If div ∈ R(d), then from the calculation above, it follows that the
marginal value v
(
S ∪ {i})− v(S) is the same for all coalitions S ⊂ N \ {i}.
Taking S = ∅, we see that this value is precisely v({i}). If this holds for all
players i ∈ N , then we conclude that v is inessential.
Conversely, suppose that v is inessential, and define the game
vi(S) =
{
v
({i}) if i ∈ S,
0 if i /∈ S.
It follows immediately that div = dvi ∈ R(d), which completes the proof. 
Therefore, inessential games have the decomposition v =
∑
i∈N vi, where
vi is the game described in the proof above. In the next section, we show
how this decomposition generalizes to arbitrary games, and how the Shapley
value naturally arises from the generalized decomposition.
3.3. Decomposition of arbitrary games and the Shapley value. For
an arbitrary game v, we cannot hope to find games vi such that div = dvi
(unless v is inessential, as shown in Proposition 3.3). However, the Hodge
decomposition (3) ensures that we can write div ∈ `2(E) as the sum of
some dvi ∈ R(d) and an element of N (d∗). Moreover, since G is connected,
N (d) ∼= R, so vi is uniquely determined by the condition vi(∅) = 0, i.e., that
vi is itself a game.
The main result of this section, Theorem 3.4, proves that these component
games vi satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry, and linearity prop-
erties. This means, in particular, that vi(N) satisfies the Shapley axioms, so
it must coincide with the Shapley value φi(v). In addition to this axiomatic
argument, we will also show directly, in Remark 3.7, that vi(N) agrees with
the Shapley formula (1).
Let P : `2(E) → R(d) denote orthogonal projection onto R(d), so that
Pdiv is the R(d) component in the Hodge decomposition of div. Note that
this projection is introduced as a theoretical tool; in practice, we will never
need to explicitly construct a matrix for P . Instead, as in Section 2.2, we
will compute the Hodge decomposition by solving a problem involving the
graph Laplacian, which will be discussed in Section 3.4.
Theorem 3.4. For each i ∈ N , let vi ∈ `2(V ) with vi(∅) be the unique game
such that dvi = Pdiv. Then the games vi satisfy the following:
(a)
∑
i∈N
vi = v.
(b) If v
(
S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N \ {i}, then vi = 0.
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(c) If σ is a permutation of N and σ∗v is the game (σ∗v)(S) = v
(
σ(S)
)
,
then (σ∗v)i = σ∗(vσ(i)). In particular, if σ is the permutation swap-
ping i and j, and if σ∗v = v, then vi = σ∗(vj).
(d) For any two games v, v′ and α, α′ ∈ R, (αv + α′v′)i = αvi + α′v′i.
Consequently, vi(N) = φi(v) is the Shapley value for each player i ∈ N .
Proof. First, since d =
∑
i∈N di, we have
d
∑
i∈N
vi =
∑
i∈N
dvi =
∑
i∈N
Pdiv = P
∑
i∈N
div = Pdv = dv.
Since G is connected, it follows that
∑
i∈N vi and v differ by a constant. But
this constant is v(∅)−∑i∈N vi(∅) = 0, which proves (a).
Next, if v
(
S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N \ {i}, then div = 0. It follows
that dvi = Pdiv = 0. Hence, vi is constant, but since vi(∅) = 0, we conclude
that vi = 0, which proves (b).
Next, if σ is a permutation of N , then direct calculation shows that
dσ∗ = σ∗d and diσ∗ = σ∗dσ(i). Furthermore, σ preserves counting measure
and hence the `2 inner product, so Pσ∗ = σ∗P . Thus,
d(σ∗v)i = Pdi(σ∗v) = Pσ∗(dσ(i)v) = σ∗(Pdσ(i)v) = σ∗(dvσ(i)) = dσ∗(vσ(i)),
so (σ∗v)i and σ∗(vσ(i)) differ by a constant. But this constant is (σ∗v)i(∅)−
σ∗(vσ(i))(∅) = vi(∅)− vσ(i)(∅) = 0, which proves (c).
Next, since d, di, and P are all linear maps,
d(αv + α′v′)i = Pdi(αv + α′v′) = αPdiv + α′Pdiv′
= αdvi + α
′dv′i = d(αvi + α
′v′i).
Hence, the games (αv+α′v′)i and (αvi +α′v′i) differ by a constant—but just
as above, this constant must be zero, which proves (d).
Finally, having shown (a)–(d), it follows that the allocation v 7→ (vi(N))i∈N
satisfies the Shapley axioms of Theorem 2.1. Indeed, condition (a) implies
efficiency, (b) implies the null-player property, (c) implies symmetry, and (d)
implies linearity. Hence, by the uniqueness property of the Shapley value, we
must have that vi(N) = φi(v) for all i ∈ N , which completes the proof. 
Remark 3.5. An immediate corollary of Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.4 is
the standard result that φi(v) = v
({i}) for all i ∈ N whenever v is inessential.
Remark 3.6. Since P is orthogonal projection onto R(d), we may also view
the game vi as the least-squares solution to dvi = div, which only has an
exact solution when v is inessential. That is, we have
vi = argmin
u∈`2(V )
u(∅)=0
‖du− div‖`2(E).
This is similar in spirit to the work of Kultti and Salonen [21] on minimum-
norm solution concepts, including the least-square values of Ruiz et al. [23].
Specifically, Kultti and Salonen [21] consider the projection of v itself onto
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the subspace of inessential games in `2(V ). By contrast, the projection in
our approach is performed on `2(E).
Remark 3.7. The decomposition of Theorem 3.4 also gives a straightforward
way to derive the Shapley formula (1). By linearity, this formula is equivalent
to the statement that, if χ(S,S∪{i}) ∈ `2(E) is the indicator function equal to
1 on
(
S, S ∪ {i}) and 0 on all other edges, and if u ∈ `2(V ) is the solution to
du = Pχ(S,S∪{i}) with u(∅) = 0, then u(N) = |S|!(|N |−1−|S|)!|N |! .
To prove this, we begin by observing that u(N) depends only on |S|, not
on the particular choice of S and i. Indeed, let |T | = |S| with j /∈ T , and let
σ be a permutation of N such that σ(S) = T and σ(i) = j. Then
d(σ∗u) = σ∗(du) = σ∗(Pχ(S,S∪{i})) = Pσ∗χ(S,S∪{i}) = Pχ(T,T∪{j}),
and (σ∗u)(N) = u
(
σ(N)
)
= u(N). Hence, we get the same value for u(N)
whether we choose the edge
(
S, S ∪ {i}) or (T, T ∪ {j}).
Next, consider the game
v(T ) :=
{
1 if |T | > |S|,
0 if |T | ≤ |S|,
so that
dv =
∑
|T |=|S|
j /∈T
χ(T,T∪{j}).
This sum contains
(|N |
|S|
)(|N |− |S|) = |N |!|S|!(|N |−1−|S|)! terms, and the symmetry
argument above shows that they all contribute equally to v(N), so
v(N) =
|N |!
|S|!(|N | − 1− |S|)!u(N).
Finally, since v(N) = 1, we obtain the claimed expression for u(N).
Example 3.8. We now illustrate the decomposition of Theorem 3.4 by
applying it to the glove game introduced in Example 2.2. Since |N | = 3, the
graph G consists of vertices and edges of the ordinary, three-dimensional
cube.
Table 1 contains the values of v and the component games v1, v2, and v3.
Several of the properties proved in Theorem 3.4 are immediately apparent.
In particular, we have the decomposition v = v1 + v2 + v3, while v1(N) =
2
3
and v2(N) = v3(N) =
1
6 are the Shapley values previously obtained in
Example 2.2. Furthermore, the symmetry of players 2 and 3 is evident in all
three component games, not just v2 and v3. Indeed, if σ is the permutation
swapping players 2 and 3, then σ∗v = v, so we have
v1 = σ
∗v1, v2 = σ∗v3, v3 = σ∗v2,
which can be observed in Table 1. We also point out that, although v ≥ 0,
the component games v1, v2, v3 may take negative values. Note also that
dvi 6= div, corresponding to the fact that the glove game is not inessential.
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S v v1 v2 v3
∅ 0 0 0 0
{1} 0 512 − 524 − 524
{2} 0 − 524 16 124
{3} 0 − 524 124 16
{1, 2} 1 58 38 0
{1, 3} 1 58 0 38
{2, 3} 0 −14 18 18
{1, 2, 3} 1 2
3
1
6
1
6
Table 1. Decomposition of the three-player glove game as
v = v1 + v2 + v3, following Theorem 3.4. The Shapley values
of 23 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 appear in bold on the last line, corresponding to
the value of the grand coalition in each component game.
3.4. Decomposition via the hypercube graph Laplacian. We now
briefly show how the component games vi may be computed using the graph
Laplacian L = d∗d, without having to explicitly compute the orthogonal
projection operator P . Denote Li := d
∗di; this is in fact a weighted graph
Laplacian, where the edge
(
S, S ∪ {j}) has weight 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
(We will say more about weighted graph Laplacians in Section 4.1.)
Proposition 3.9. For each i ∈ N , the component game vi of Theorem 3.4
is the unique solution to Lvi = Liv such that vi(∅) = 0.
Proof. Since (dvi − div) ∈ N (d∗), we immediately have
0 = d∗(dvi − div) = d∗dvi − d∗div = Lvi − Liv,
so Lvi = Liv as claimed. To show uniqueness, suppose that v
′
i is another
solution. Then L(vi−v′i) = 0, and since the hypercube graph is connected, we
must have vi − v′i constant. But vi(∅) = v′i(∅), so it follows that vi = v′i. 
Remark 3.10. Equivalently, recall from Remark 3.6 that vi may also be
seen as the least-squares solution to dvi = div. From this point of view,
d∗dvi = d∗div is precisely the system of normal equations corresponding to
this least-squares problem, as previously discussed in Section 2.2.
3.5. Explicit decomposition via discrete Green’s functions. In Propo-
sition 3.9, we characterized the component game vi implicitly, as the solution
to Lvi = Liv with vi(∅) = 0. In fact, it is possible to obtain an explicit
formula for vi, in terms of the discrete Green’s function for the hypercube
graph Laplacian (Chung and Yau [4, Example 4]). For an arbitrary game
v and coalition S ⊂ N , the formula for vi(S) is a bit unwieldy, but we also
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present two situations in which it simplifies nicely. First, when S = N , we
show that the formula for vi(N) yields the Shapley formula (1), giving an
alternative proof that vi(N) = φi(v). Second, when v is a pure bargaining
game, where v(S) = 0 for S 6= N , we give an explicit formula for vi(S).
Let y ∈ R(d∗), and consider the problem Lu = y. Rather than imposing
the condition u(∅) = 0, we instead seek the unique solution u ∈ R(d∗).1 The
solution vanishing on ∅ is then simply u− u(∅). Since the restriction of L
to R(d∗) is symmetric positive definite, it has a symmetric positive definite
inverse K, and the solution is u = Ky. Writing out the matrix multiplication
explicitly, we have
u(S) =
∑
T⊂N
K(S, T )y(T ),
where K(·, ·) is called the discrete Green’s function. Chung and Yau [4,
Example 4] showed that, for the hypercube graph Laplacian with |N | = n,
this is given by the formula
K(S, T ) =
1
n22n
(
−
∑
j<k
[(
n
0
)
+ · · ·+ (nj)][( nj+1)+ · · ·+ (nn)](
n−1
j
)
+
∑
k≤j
[(
n
j+1
)
+ · · ·+ (nn)]2(
n−1
j
) ),
where k = |S 4 T | is the distance between S and T in the graph; here,
S 4 T := (S ∪ T ) \ (S ∩ T ) is the symmetric difference of S and T . (We
remark that this differs from the formula in Chung and Yau [4] by a factor
of 1n , since they consider the normalized graph Laplacian
1
nL.)
Given a game v, we may therefore use this approach to calculate ui = KLiv
explicitly and then take vi = ui − ui(∅). Fortunately, the fact that y = Liv
simplifies the formulas substantially. Given T ⊂ N \ {i},
(Liv)
(
T ∪ {i}) = v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) = −(Liv)(T ),
and therefore,
ui(S) =
∑
T⊂N\{i}
(
K
(
S, T ∪ {i})−K(S, T ))(v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ))
Furthermore, if S ⊂ N \ {i} is distance k from T , then it is distance k + 1
from T ∪ {i}. Therefore, all but the j = k terms in K(S, T ∪ {i})−K(S, T )
1Since R(d∗) is the orthogonal complement of N (d) ∼= R, this is equivalent to saying
that y and u are orthogonal to constant functions, i.e., that
∑
S⊂N y(S) =
∑
S⊂N u(S) = 0.
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cancel, leaving
K
(
S, T ∪ {i})−K(S, T )
= − 1
n22n
[(
n
0
)
+ · · ·+ (nk)][( nk+1)+ · · ·+ (nn)]+ [( nk+1)+ · · ·+ (nn)]2(
n−1
k
)
= − 1
n22n
[(
n
0
)
+ · · ·+ (nk)+ ( nk+1)+ · · ·+ (nn)][( nk+1)+ · · ·+ (nn)](
n−1
k
)
= − 1
n2n
(
n
k+1
)
+ · · ·+ (nn)(
n−1
k
) .
Similarly, S ∪ {i} is distance k from T ∪ {i} and distance k + 1 from T , so
K
(
S ∪ {i}, T ∪ {i})−K(S ∪ {i}, T ) = 1
n2n
(
n
k+1
)
+ · · ·+ (nn)(
n−1
k
) .
We have just proved the following theorem.
Theorem 3.11. For each i ∈ N , the component game vi of Theorem 3.4 is
given by vi = ui − ui(∅), where, for S ⊂ N \ {i},
ui
(
S ∪ {i}) = 1|N |2|N | ∑
T⊂N\{i}
( |N |
|S4T |+1
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||N |)(|N |−1
|S4T |
) (v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )),
and ui(S) = −ui
(
S ∪ {i}). In particular,
ui(∅) = − 1|N |2|N |
∑
T⊂N\{i}
( |N |
|T |+1
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||N |)(|N |−1
|T |
) (v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )).
Remark 3.12. This immediately gives us an explicit formula for the projection
Pdiv = dvi = dui ∈ R(d).
We now use this formula to get a new proof that vi(N) = φi(v) is the
Shapley value. Observe that the distance from S = N \ {i} to T ⊂ N \ {i}
is just |N | − |T | − 1, so Theorem 3.11 says that
ui(N) =
1
|N |2|N |
∑
T⊂N\{i}
( |N |
|N |−|T |
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||N |)( |N |−1
|N |−|T |−1
) (v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ))
=
1
|N |2|N |
∑
T⊂N\{i}
(|N |
0
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||T |)(|N |−1
|T |
) (v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )).
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Subtracting vi(N) = ui(N)− ui(∅) and using
(|N |
0
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||N |) = 2|N | gives
vi(N) =
1
|N |
∑
T⊂N\{i}
1(|N |−1
|T |
)(v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ))
=
∑
T⊂N\{i}
|T |!(|N | − 1− |T |)!
|N |!
(
v
(
T ∪ {i})− v(T )),
which is precisely the Shapley formula (1) for φi(v).
Finally, we apply Theorem 3.11 to the case where v is a pure bargaining
game, i.e., where v(S) = 0 for S 6= N .
Theorem 3.13. Let v be a pure bargaining game, i ∈ N , and S ⊂ N \ {i}.
Then the component game vi is given by
vi
(
S ∪ {i}) = 1|N |2|N |
(
1 +
(|N |
0
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||S|)(|N |−1
|S|
) )v(N),
vi(S) =
1
|N |2|N |
(
1−
(|N |
0
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||S|)(|N |−1
|S|
) )v(N).
Proof. Observe that v
(
T ∪ {i})− v(T ) vanishes for T ( N \ {i} and equals
v(N) for T = N \ {i}. The distance between S ⊂ N \ {i} and T = N \ {i}
is just |N | − |S| − 1, so applying Theorem 3.11 gives
ui
(
S ∪ {i}) = 1|N |2|N |
( |N |
|N |−|S|
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||N |)( |N |−1
|N |−|S|−1
) v(N)
=
1
|N |2|N |
(|N |
0
)
+ · · ·+ (|N ||S|)(|N |−1
|S|
) v(N),
and ui(S) = −ui
(
S ∪ {i}). In particular, for S = ∅, we get
ui(∅) = − 1|N |2|N | v(N),
and the result follows immediately from vi = ui − ui(∅). 
4. Weighted decompositions and restricted cooperation
4.1. Decomposition of cooperative games with weighted edges. Sup-
pose that each edge
(
S, S ∪ {i}) ∈ E of the hypercube graph is assigned
a weight w
(
S, S ∪ {i}) > 0. We define `2w(E) to be the space of functions
E → R equipped with the weighted `2 inner product,
〈f, g〉w :=
∑
(S,S∪{i})∈E
w
(
S, S ∪ {i})f(S, S ∪ {i})g(S, S ∪ {i}).
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The setting of Section 3 corresponds to the special case where w = 1 on every
edge. (Equivalently, w may be any positive constant, not necessarily 1.)
The weighted inner product affects the Hodge decomposition as follows.
Although d: `2(V ) → `2w(E) is unchanged, d∗w : `2w(E) → `2(V ) is now the
adjoint with respect to the weighted inner product. We then have the
combinatorial Hodge decomposition
`2w(E) = R(d)⊕N (d∗w),
where the direct sum is `2w-orthogonal rather than `
2-orthogonal.
Denote by Pw : `
2
w(E) → R(d) the `2w-orthogonal projection onto R(d).
The decomposition of cooperative games in Theorem 3.4 may then be gener-
alized as follows.
Theorem 4.1. For each i ∈ N , let vi,w ∈ `2(V ) with vi,w(∅) = 0 be the
unique game such that dvi,w = Pwdiv. Then:
(a)
∑
i∈N
vi,w = v.
(b) If v
(
S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N \ {i}, then vi,w = 0.
(c) If σ is a permutation of N , then (σ∗v)i,σ∗w = σ∗(vσ(i),w). In partic-
ular, if σ is the permutation swapping i and j, and if σ∗v = v and
σ∗w = w, then vi,w = σ∗(vj,w).
(d) For any two games v, v′ and α, α′ ∈ R, (αv+α′v′)i,w = αvi,w+α′v′i,w.
Proof. The proofs of (a), (b), and (d) are just as in Theorem 3.4, since the
weighted projection Pw is still linear and equal to the identity on R(d).
For (c), we can no longer assume that a permutation preserves the `2w
inner product. However, we do have 〈f, g〉w = 〈σ∗f, σ∗g〉σ∗w, which implies
Pσ∗wσ
∗ = σ∗Pw. Therefore,
d(σ∗v)i,σ∗w = Pσ∗wdi(σ∗v) = Pσ∗wσ∗(dσ(i)v)
= σ∗(Pwdσ(i)v) = σ∗(dvσ(i),w) = dσ∗(vσ(i),w),
and the rest of the argument proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 3.4. 
Corollary 4.2. If σ∗w = w for all permutations σ, then φi(v) = vi,w(N).
Proof. If w is invariant under permutations, then (a)–(d) imply that vi,w(N)
satisfies the Shapley axioms, so it must be the Shapley value φi(v). 
As in Remark 3.6, we may view the component vi as a weighted least-
squares solution to dvi = div, in the sense that
vi = argmin
u∈`2(V )
u(∅)=0
‖du− div‖`2w(E).
We can also cast this in terms of the weighted graph Laplacians Lw := d
∗
wd
and Lwi := d
∗
wdi = d
∗
wid, where the weight function wi is defined by
wi
(
S, S ∪ {j}) := {w(S, S ∪ {i}) if i = j,
0 if i 6= j.
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S v v1 v2 v3
∅ 0 0 0 0
{1} 0 1631 − 831 − 831
{2} 0 − 831 631 231
{3} 0 − 831 231 631
{1, 2} 1 2031 2162 162
{1, 3} 1 2031 162 2162
{2, 3} 0 − 931 962 962
{1, 2, 3} 1 2
3
1
6
1
6
Table 2. Decomposition of the three-player glove game as
v = v1 + v2 + v3, following Theorem 4.1, with weight function
w(S) = |S|+ 1. The Shapley values of 23 , 16 , 16 appear in bold
on the last line, since the weight function is totally symmetric,
but the components are elsewhere distinct from those in
Table 1.
The following generalization of Proposition 3.9 is stated without proof, since
the proof is essentially identical. It can also be seen as an expression of the
normal equations for the weighted least-squares problem.
Proposition 4.3. For each i ∈ N , the component game vi of Theorem 4.1
is the unique solution to Lwvi = Lwiv such that vi(∅) = 0.
One consequence of Corollary 4.2 is that, although the Shapley value is
unique, the decomposition v =
∑
i∈N vi of Theorem 3.4 generally is not.
Indeed, any totally symmetric weight function w will yield a decomposition
satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3.4, and these will generally not agree
with one another—except at N , where they all give the Shapley value. This
is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.4. In Example 3.8, we decomposed the glove game with respect
to the `2 inner product, corresponding to the constant weight function
w ≡ 1. Suppose instead that we take w(S, S ∪ {i}) = |S| + 1, which is
totally symmetric but not constant. The resulting decomposition is shown
in Table 2, and is distinct from that obtained in Example 3.8 and shown in
Table 1. However, due to the symmetry of w, the Shapley values are again
recovered as the value of the grand coalition in each component game. Note
that the symmetry of players 2 and 3 is still apparent in the component
games.
Example 4.5. Again, consider the glove game, but take the weight function
to be w
(∅, {1}) = 12 and w = 1 otherwise. This may be interpreted as player
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S v v1 v2 v3
∅ 0 0 0 0
{1} 0 1017 − 517 − 517
{2} 0 − 534 37272 3272
{3} 0 − 534 3272 37272
{1, 2} 1 2534 87272 − 15272
{1, 3} 1 2534 − 15272 87272
{2, 3} 0 − 317 334 334
{1, 2, 3} 1 13
17
2
17
2
17
Table 3. Decomposition of the three-player glove game as
v = v1 + v2 + v3, following Theorem 4.1, with weight function
w
(∅, {1}) = 12 and w = 1 otherwise. The bold values vi(N)
on the last line no longer correspond to the Shapley values,
since w is not totally symmetric.
1 being reluctant (but not totally unwilling) to be the first player to join
the coalition. The resulting decomposition is shown in Table 3. Unlike in
the previous examples, this w is not totally symmetric, and consequently
the values v1(N) =
13
17 and v2(N) = v3(N) =
2
17 no longer agree with the
Shapley values. Since player 1 is less willing to join the coalition first (i.e., to
contribute zero marginal value), the payoff to player 1 is increased from 23 to
13
17 at the expense of players 2 and 3, the payoff to each of whom is reduced
from 16 to
2
17 . Note that the symmetry of players 2 and 3 is still maintained.
Remark 4.6. The weighted Shapley value of Shapley [24] and Kalai and Samet
[17] also models asymmetry between players, but it does so in a fundamentally
different way from the approach considered here. In Shapley [24] each player
is assigned a weight, while Kalai and Samet [17] generalized these player
weights to “weight systems.” It would be interesting to investigate whether
these approaches can be related by using player weights (or weight systems)
to construct corresponding edge weights.
4.2. Decomposition of games with restricted cooperation. The frame-
work discussed in the preceding sections, as in Shapley [25], assumes that
every player i ∈ N is willing to join every coalition S ⊂ N , so every such
coalition may be feasibly formed en route to the grand coalition. In models
of restricted cooperation, however, this is not the case. The precedence con-
straints of Faigle and Kern [10] impose a partial ordering on N , so that some
players are constrained to join the coalition prior to others. Khmelnitskaya
et al. [18] have recently generalized this to so-called digraph games, where
precedence is determined by a digraph on N that (unlike the Faigle and
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Kern [10]) may contain cycles; a player i may be required to precede another
player j in some coalitions but not others. (For another recent model of
restricted cooperation, see Koshevoy et al. [20].)
The constraints above all correspond to situations where a player i is
forbidden to join a coalition S ⊂ N \ {i}. In this case, we say that the
edge
(
S, S ∪ {i}) is infeasible, and we remove it from the hypercube graph.
If we continue in this manner, removing all edges and vertices that are
incompatible with the constraints, then we arrive at a graph G = (V,E)
which is a subgraph of the hypercube graph. Here, V contains the so-called
feasible coalitions that are compatible with the constraints.
Assume that G is connected and that ∅, N ∈ V , so that a coalition is
feasible if and only if it can be formed starting from ∅, and the grand coalition
is feasible. Since the Hodge decomposition may be defined on any graph—in
particular, on the subgraph G of the hypercube graph—we again obtain
a decomposition v =
∑
i∈N vi, defined by dvi = Pdiv with vi(∅) = 0 for
i ∈ N . Since G is connected, we again have N (d) ∼= R, so the decomposition
is unique; moreover, it satisfies conditions (a)–(d) of Theorem 4.1, if we
interpret the missing edges as having weight zero.
Example 4.7. In the glove game, suppose that player 1 refuses to join the
coalition first, so that {1} and all its incident edges are removed from the
graph. The resulting decomposition is shown in Table 4. Note that v1 = v
and v2 = v3 = 0, so that player 1 captures all of the value of the game. The
reason for this is that, by removing the only edges on which players 2 and 3
contribute marginal value, the constraints have turned players 2 and 3 into
null players. Observe also that dvi = div for all i ∈ N , so the constraints
have effectively made the game inessential.
Example 4.8. On the other hand, suppose that player {2} refuses to join
the coalition first, so that {2} and all its incident edges are removed from
the graph. The resulting decomposition is shown in Table 5. Unlike in the
previous example, all three players still contribute marginal value on some
of the remaining feasible edges. However, removing an edge on which player
2 contributes zero marginal value causes the payoff to player 2 to increase
from 16 to
3
10 . Interestingly, player 3 also receives a slightly increased payoff,
from 16 to
1
5 , since player 3 contributes zero marginal value to any coalition
that already contains player 2, and one such coalition has been removed from
consideration. Both players 2 and 3 benefit at the expense of player 1, whose
payoff is decreased from 23 to
1
2 .
Remark 4.9. The values obtained in Example 4.8 are different from the Shap-
ley values with precedence constraints in Faigle and Kern [10], Khmelnitskaya
et al. [18], which are (12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4). These take the approach of averaging over
feasible permutations, a generalization of (2). In this case, there are four
feasible permutations—(1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2), (3, 1, 2), and (3, 2, 1)—and player
1 contributes marginal value 1 in two of these, while players 2 and 3 each
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S v v1 v2 v3
∅ 0 0 0 0
{2} 0 0 0 0
{3} 0 0 0 0
{1, 2} 1 1 0 0
{1, 3} 1 1 0 0
{2, 3} 0 0 0 0
{1, 2, 3} 1 1 0 0
Table 4. Decomposition of the three-player glove game as
v = v1+v2+v3, where {1} and its incident edges are removed
from the hypercube graph. This causes players 2 and 3 to
become null players, so player 1 receives all the value, and
the game becomes inessential.
S v v1 v2 v3
∅ 0 0 0 0
{1} 0 310 − 110 −15
{3} 0 − 310 110 15
{1, 2} 1 25 35 0
{1, 3} 1 12 110 25
{2, 3} 0 −25 15 15
{1, 2, 3} 1 1
2
3
10
1
5
Table 5. Decomposition of the three-player glove game as
v = v1+v2+v3, where {2} and its incident edges are removed
from the hypercube graph.
contribute marginal value 1 in one permutation. This illustrates that, unlike
the case in Section 3, these solution concepts are generally distinct.
(We also note that, as pointed out in Section 2.1, it is computationally
undesirable to average over permutations, since this is factorial in |N |,
whereas solving a |V | × |V | linear system is only exponential in |N |.)
Finally, we note that we may also consider weighted subgraphs of the
hypercube graph, combining the approach above with that of Section 4.1,
in the obvious way. The next example illustrates that if we weight the
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S v v1 v2 v3
∅ 0 0 0 0
{1} 0 13 − 112 −14
{3} 0 −13 112 14
{1, 2} 1 512 712 0
{1, 3} 1 12 112 512
{2, 3} 0 − 512 16 14
{1, 2, 3} 1 1
2
1
4
1
4
Table 6. Decomposition of the three-player glove game as
v = v1+v2+v3, where {2} and its incident edges are removed
from the hypercube graph, and where each edge is weighted
by the product of the degrees of its incident vertices.
edges according to the degrees of the incident vertices—which are gener-
ally non-constant once edges have been removed—we may obtain different
decompositions of the game than if we used a constant edge weight.
Example 4.10. Consider again the restricted glove game of Example 4.8,
where player 2 refuses to join the coalition first, so that {2} and its incident
edges are removed from the hypercube graph. Instead of taking the edge
weights w ≡ 1, suppose we take w(a, b) = deg(a)deg(b). This weight function
is related to a graph Laplacian with vertex weights considered by Lova´sz
[22], as observed by Chung and Langlands [6].
The resulting decomposition is shown in Table 6. In this case, the players
receive the payoffs (12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4), which is distinct from the constant-weight payoffs
(12 ,
3
10 ,
2
5) of Example 4.8. (This also happens to agree with the Shapley values
with precedence constraints in Remark 4.9, although this need not be the case
for an arbitrary game.) Note that, although v2(N) = v3(N), the component
games v2 and v3 display asymmetry elsewhere: e.g., v2
({2, 3}) 6= v3({2, 3}).
This is due to the asymmetry between players 2 and 3 in the graph.
5. Conclusion
We have used the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a hypercube
graph to show that any cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of
component games, one component for each player, so that this decomposition
satisfies appropriate efficiency, null-player, symmetry, and linearity properties.
This yields a new characterization of the Shapley value as the value of the
grand coalition in each player’s component game.
We have also shown that this game decomposition may be understood in
terms of the least-squares solution to a linear problem, where the solution is
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exact if and only if the game is inessential. In this sense, our decomposition
may be considered as an edge-based (rather than vertex-based) variant of the
least-squares and minimum-norm solution concepts of Ruiz et al. [23] and
Kultti and Salonen [21]. The normal equations for this linear problem yield
another, equivalent characterization of the game decomposition in terms
of the well-studied graph Laplacian. This allowed us to obtain an explicit
formula for each component game by applying the discrete Green’s function
for the hypercube graph Laplacian.
Finally, we have shown how this decomposition may be generalized, in
a natural way, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition for weighted
graphs and subgraphs of the hypercube graph. These generalized decom-
positions preserve the efficiency, null-player, symmetry (in an appropriate
sense, modulo the symmetry of the weights and the subgraph), and linearity
properties obtained earlier. This yields a family of decompositions, and
corresponding solution concepts, for problems where players exhibit variable
willingness or unwillingness to join certain coalitions, and we have com-
pared and contrasted these solution concepts with those of Faigle and Kern
[10], Khmelnitskaya et al. [18] for certain models of restricted cooperation.
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